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CORN, COWS, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: HOW
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ENABLE
FACTORY FARMING AND EXACERBATE U.S.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
Trevor J. Smith*
Abstract:
As people around the globe grapple with the realities of an ever-warming
planet, Americans, too, are coping with some of the attendant consequences of
climate change: severe droughts, storms, and wildfires to name just a few. In
response, Americans are evaluating their personal and collective contributions to
the climate crisis. Notwithstanding President Trump’s unilateral move in June
2017 to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, the international
community is pressing forward with comprehensive strategies to mitigate
anthropogenic sources of atmospheric carbon. Despite their best efforts, however,
most of these actions focus on the energy and transportation sectors while
largely ignoring the most significant, though lesser acknowledged, climate
culprit of them all: industrial animal agriculture (or “factory farming”).
Like many of its international counterparts, the United States currently has
no broad-based plan to mitigate carbon emissions from its livestock industry.
However, if Americans can garner the political will to prioritize the climate
impacts of animal agriculture, any effective emissions-reduction strategy must
be multi-faceted. The strategy must address the underlying drivers of factory
farming and not just livestock-related emissions. This necessarily requires an
overhaul of federal crop subsidies that provide livestock producers with a glut of
cheap feed grains—corn and soy, specifically—that enable them to produce meat
well below its true cost. Shifting federal subsidies away from commodity crops
and toward a broader array of fruits, vegetables, and nuts (or “specialty crops”)
could level the playing field between commodity crop and specialty crop
production. Additionally, shifting federal subsidies to specialty crops could
catalyze a change in consumer choices away from carbon-intensive meat and
toward more carbon-neutral, plant-based alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate scientists overwhelmingly agree that our planet is
warming, and that humans are primarily to blame. 1 Earth’s
average temperature increased between 0.4 and 0.8 degrees
Celsius during the past 100 years. 2 As a result, the polar ice
caps are melting, sea levels are rising, oceans are acidifying,
habitats are shrinking, and severe weather events are
intensifying.3
There are no indications these distressing trends will
decelerate anytime soon. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC)—an international body of scientists
that assesses the research on climate change and advises
policymakers4—“recently predicted that average global
* Trevor J. Smith, J.D. with a certificate in Environmental Law, 2013, Florida State
University College of Law; LL.M., Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 2018,
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Arnold Reitze for supervising this article, my classmates in the climate change
seminar for their constructive feedback, the staff of the Washington Journal of
Environmental Law & Policy for their work in preparing this piece for publication, and
my husband, Guy, for his love and support.
1. Scientific
Consensus:
Earth’s
Climate
is
Warming,
NASA,
https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/RXJ7-DEKM] (last
visited Mar. 12, 2019).
2. See Global Warming: News, Facts, Causes & Effects, LIVESCIENCE,
https://www.livescience.com/topics/global-warming [https://perma.cc/M5JV-EEP4] (last
visited Mar. 12, 2019).
3. See, e.g., How Climate is Changing, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/
[https://perma.cc/M74U-MMW8] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (detailing some of the
predicted long-term impacts of climate change, including: lengthened frost-free
seasons, more droughts and heat waves, stronger and more intense hurricanes, sea
level rise of one to four feet by 2100, and an ice-free Arctic).
4. About the IPCC, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://www.ipcc.ch/about/ [https://perma.cc/NFG3-KALS] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
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temperatures could increase between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees
Celsius by the year 2100.”5 In light of this startling prediction,
the 2015 Paris Agreement, an outgrowth of the original 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC),6 set an ambitious goal of “strengthen[ing] the
global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a
global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees
Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to
limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees
Celsius.”7
The temperature hike over the last fifty years is largely
attributable to a handful of anthropogenic activities, such as
the burning of fossil fuels, land clearing, and agricultural
practices.8 However, despite the efforts of the international
community to stave off rising temperatures, they have ignored
the largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions: animal
agriculture. Nearly all of the focus has been on reducing
carbon emissions from the energy and transportation sectors
while “neglecting agriculture generally and livestock
production in particular.”9
In its seminal 2006 report, Livestock’s Long Shadow, the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
conducted a broad assessment regarding the magnitude of
greenhouse gas emissions attributable to livestock
production.10 “The FAO estimated that livestock production
was responsible for 18% of global [greenhouse gas emissions]

5. See LIVESCIENCE, supra note 2.
6. See About the Secretariat, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
SECRETARIAT,
https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat
[https://perma.cc/8W4H-NPXE] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
7. The Paris Agreement, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
SECRETARIAT,
https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement
[https://perma.cc/UT3Q-3CJT] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
8. See LIVESCIENCE, supra note 2.
9. See Debra L. Donahue, Livestock Production, Climate Change, and Human
Health: Closing the Awareness Gap, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11112, 11113
(2015) (citing ROB BAILEY ET AL., CHATHAM HOUSE: ROYAL I NST. OF INT’L AFFS.,
LIVESTOCK—CLIMATE CHANGE’S FORGOTTEN SECTOR: GLOBAL PUB. OPINION ON MEAT
AND DAIRY CONSUMPTION 12 (2014)).
10. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW: ENVTL. ISSUES
AND
OPTIONS xxi (2006), http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM
[https://perma.cc/D4NM-AUPV] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
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in carbon dioxide equivalent,”11 which may not seem too hefty
on its face. Importantly, though, livestock accounted for 3540% of all anthropogenic sources of methane and 65% of
nitrous oxide—two highly potent greenhouse gases. 12 Based on
these figures, the report concluded that livestock’s contribution
to climate change exceeded that of the global transportation
sector.13 According to the FAO’s more recent calculations from
2013, total emissions from global livestock represent 14.5% of
all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. 14 Most scientists
concur that livestock’s share of total greenhouse gas emissions
globally is in the 14-18% range.15
Increasing numbers of scientists warn that in order to avoid
surpassing
the
internationally-recognized
two-degree
temperature-rise threshold, nations must make significant
short-term reductions in all greenhouse gas emissions, with a
primary focus on reducing methane emissions from livestock
production.16 Despite this clarion call, of the 40 developed
countries listed under Annex I of the UNFCCC,17 only Bulgaria
and France had established a quantitative reduction target for
livestock-related emissions in 2015.18
Like the vast majority of developed countries, the United
States also lacks a comprehensive strategy to mitigate

11. Donahue, supra note 9, at 11112 (citing LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW, supra note
10, at 112, tbl. 3–12 at 113, 114, 272).
12. See id., supra note 9, at 11112.
13. See id., supra note 9, at 11112.
14. Key Facts and Findings, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.,
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/197623/icode/
[https://perma.cc/8RHH-2BW4]
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019). To access the full 2013 report, Tackling Climate Change
Through Livestock: A Global Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Opportunities,
see http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3437e.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7D6-EVZU].
15. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 11113.
16. See id., supra note 9, at 11113.
17. See id., supra note 9, at 11113. The UNFCCC divides countries into three main
groups—Annex I, Annex II, and Non-Annex 1 Parties—according to differing
commitments. Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1992, plus
countries with economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic
States, and several Central and Eastern European States. See Parties and Observers,
U.N.
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
SECRETARIAT,
https://unfccc.int/parties-observers [https://perma.cc/D4YC-QBGQ] (last visited Mar.
12, 2019).
18. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 11113.
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emissions from animal agriculture. Livestock is the number
one source of methane emissions in this country, and “[c]attle
are the main contributor to the [livestock] sector’s [greenhouse
gas] emissions.”19 Despite this reality, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been severely
underestimating
livestock-related
emissions.
Livestock
operations across the country reportedly emit almost twice
what the EPA attributes to them in its recent inventories. 20 To
its credit, the EPA maintains a list of voluntary measures the
livestock industry can employ to reduce its carbon footprint.21
But voluntary action is no substitute for comprehensive
federal regulation. If the United States and other nations do
not begin to implement stringent regulatory schemes aimed at
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from livestock, scientists
warn that agriculture-related emissions alone will almost
reach the full two-degree target emissions allowance by 2050.22
The U.N. cautions that “even with ambitious supply-side
mitigation in the agricultural sector, without radical shifts in
the consumption of meat and dairy products, growth in
agricultural emissions will leave insufficient space within a
two-degree carbon budget for other sectors”23 like energy or
transportation. Although it is theoretically possible to
decarbonize energy supply, complete reductions are not
feasible in the livestock part of the agricultural sector because
of the biological realities of ruminant digestion—farm animals
release excessive amounts of methane. (See infra Part I.)
Therefore, to achieve significant reductions in emissions from
animal agriculture, we must focus on demand-side reductions
by encouraging greater consumption of a diverse array of

19. See id., supra note 9, at 11113 (citing Pierre J. Gerber et al., Food & Agric. Org.
of the United Nations, Tackling Climate Change Through Livestock: A Global
Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Opportunities 15 (2013)).
20. See Scot M. Miller et al., Anthropogenic Emissions of Methane in the United
States., 110 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20018, 20020, 20022 (2013).
21. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
[https://perma.cc/2PCA-FCP9] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
22. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 11114 (citing Bojana Bajzelj et al., Importance of
Food-Demand Mgmt. for Climate Mitigation, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 924, 924
(2014)).
23. Id. (quoting BAILEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 12).
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specialty crops24—like fruits, vegetables, and nuts—and other
plant-based foods.
In the following sections, I provide a general overview of
greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and livestock
production in the United States, explaining why the animal
agriculture sector is the leading source of greenhouse gas
emissions. I then examine the multibillion-dollar federal
agricultural subsidies programs, which have led to the cost of
meat being artificially low and have prioritized commodity
crop production—the vast majority of which is used as
livestock feed—over other fruits and vegetables. This is the
result of efforts by the agribusiness lobby that has
commandeered a once well-intentioned welfare program for
small farmers. Finally, I suggest that one potential way to
mitigate livestock-related emissions in the United States is to
redirect federal agricultural subsidies, particularly crop
insurance subsidies, away from industrial commodity crops
and toward a broader array of fruits, vegetables, and specialty
crops. In theory, allowing these specialty crops to fairly
compete in the market could, in turn, encourage consumers to
buy more affordable—and less carbon-polluting—fruits and
vegetables while simultaneously weaning themselves off of
commodity-crop fed and more carbon-intensive meat.
I. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM AMERICAN
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE
Agriculture is the largest use of land in the United States.25
A 2012 study from the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) estimated that land used for agricultural
purposes, including cropland, grassland pasture and range,

24. See generally § 101 of the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1621, and amended under § 10010 of the Agricultural Act of 2014, Public Law 113–
79 (the “Farm Bill”), defines specialty crops as “fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried
fruits, horticulture, and nursery crops (including floriculture)”. For a full list of
specialty crops, see What is a Specialty Crop?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/scbgp/specialty-crop
[https://perma.cc/4MCB-8P4C] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
25. DANIEL P. BIGELOW & ALLISON BORCHERS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MAJOR USES OF
LAND
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES,
2012,
at
3,
4
(2017),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/84880/eib-178.pdf?v=0
[https://perma.cc/K78C-LWU9] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
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grazed forestland, land in farmsteads, and the area occupied
by farm roads and lanes, totaled 1.18 billion acres, or 52.5% of
the United States’ total landmass and about 63% of the
landmass in the lower 48 states. 26 Of the country’s 2.3 billion
total acres, roughly 380 million acres are used as cropland, 655
million acres as grassland pasture and range, and 130 million
acres as grazed forestland. 27 Because of agriculture’s dominant
footprint across the national landscape, even relatively minor
changes in agricultural practices when broadly implemented
can have substantial impacts on the sector’s overall
contribution to climate change.
The EPA estimates that emissions from agriculture account
for nearly 8% of annual U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. 28 At
first glance, this may appear rather insignificant, particularly
when juxtaposed with energy-related activities, including
electricity generation and transportation. Indeed, the energy
and transportation sectors are the primary sources of the
country’s anthropogenic greenhouse gases, accounting for over
84% of total emissions. 29 But upon closer inspection,
agriculture is the primary climate-impacting culprit because of
the outsized radiative effects of methane and nitrous oxide as
compared to carbon dioxide. This may come as a surprise to
many Americans.
While energy-related activities primarily emit carbon
dioxide through the burning of fossil fuels, “crop and livestock
greenhouse gas emissions consist largely of nitrous oxide and
methane,” both of which are notoriously potent greenhouse
gases.30 The average global warming potential of nitrous oxide
and methane is, respectively, 265-298 times and 28-36 times
that of carbon dioxide over 100 years.31 Thus, while the energy
26. See id.
27. Id. at 4 tbl. 1 (Agricultural and nonagricultural uses of U.S. land, 2012).
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS, 1990–2015, at 5–1 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201702/documents/2017_complete_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/42QY-SXVT] (last visited
Mar. 12, 2019).
29. Id. at 3–1.
30. See Peter Lehner & Nathan A. Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-Neutral
Agriculture., 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10845, 10846 (2017).
31. Understanding Global Warming Potentials, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials
[https://perma.cc/MB29-DC6Q] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
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and transportation sectors combined emit 97% of the nation’s
carbon dioxide,32 their climate change impacts are outweighed
by the agriculture sector’s contribution of 35% of the nation’s
methane emissions and 80% of its nitrous oxide emissions.33
Put into perspective, in 2015, agricultural emissions of
methane and nitrous oxide were the equivalent of 520 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide—or the carbon emissions from
111 million automobiles in an average year.34
The vast majority of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions
are inextricably linked to one conspicuously problematic
behemoth—industrial animal agriculture (also colloquially
called “factory farms” or “concentrated animal feeding
operations” (CAFOs) in federal environmental statutes). Meat
and dairy production account for nearly 80% of all the
agricultural emissions in the United States. 35 According to
EPA studies, the top three sources of U.S. agricultural
emissions are (1) soil management, (2) enteric fermentation,
and (3) manure management,36 which directly or tangentially
relate to intensive livestock production.
Soil management generally refers to various practices
32. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 3–1.
33. Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Methane Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/G65BBQV6] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019); Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Nitrous Oxide
Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overviewgreenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/Y4WC-6H26] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
34. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30 (comparing the EPA’s 2015 inventory of
greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector with typical passenger vehicles,
which emit about 4.7 metric tons of carbon dioxide annually); see also Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from a Typical Passenger Vehicle, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-typical-passenger-vehicle
[https://perma.cc/7XUH-DL23] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
35. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10848, n.27 (calculating that the
collective emissions from enteric fermentation, manure management, and nitrous
oxide emissions from agricultural soils devoted to feed crop production and grazing are
responsible for 405.1 MMT carbon dioxide eq. annually, or 78% of total U.S.
agricultural emissions).
36. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10846–47. Agriculture also produces
carbon dioxide emissions from on-farm fossil fuel combustion and from the energy
inputs to produce pesticides and fertilizer. See generally CLAUDIA HITAJ & SHELLYE
SUTTLES, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., TRENDS IN U.S. A GRICULTURE’S CONSUMPTION AND
PRODUCTION OF ENERGY: RENEWABLE POWER, SHALE ENERGY, AND CELLULOSIC
BIOMAS
(2016),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/74658/60128_eib159.pdf?v=42593
[https://perma.cc/VH4M-BA6G] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
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designed to improve crop yield—like fertilization—and is
responsible for “48% of all U.S. agricultural emissions and 93%
of all U.S. nitrous oxide emissions.”37 From 1990 to 2015, 74%
of these nitrous oxide emissions came from cropland (as
opposed to grazed grasslands).38 Notably, over three-quarters
of all harvested cropland in this country is devoted to feed crop
production.39 “This cropland is often cultivated more intensely
than cropland growing human food, with the result that feed
crop production can emit more nitrous oxide per acre than the
production of crops for human consumption.”40
The second largest source is enteric fermentation, which
accounts for 32% of the nation’s agricultural emissions and
25% of its total methane emissions. 41 Enteric fermentation is
the scientific term for the normal digestive processes of
ruminant animals (primarily cows and sheep), during which
microbes resident in an animal’s digestive system ferment the
plants and grasses consumed by the animal.42 The
fermentation process produces methane as a byproduct, which
the animals “exhale” and “eructate” (or, in pedestrian terms,
“burp” and “fart”) into the air.43
Manure management is the third major category, releasing
approximately two million tons of nitrous oxide and methane
emissions annually 44 and accounting for 16% of the nation’s
total agricultural emissions.45 Factory farms produce the bulk

37. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10846–47 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–2, 5–21, 5–22).
38. See id., supra note 30, at 5–24, tbl. 5–15.
39. See BIGELOW & BORCHERS, supra note 25, at 20, 24 tbl. 6 (USDA estimated that
of the 308 million acres of harvested cropland in 2012, approximately 237 million acres
were used for feed crops, while only about 61 million acres were used for food crops).
40. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10847.
41. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–2, tbl. 5–1.
42. See id., supra note 28, at 5–3.
43. See id.
44. See R. Jason Richards & Erica L. Richards, Cheap Meat: How Factory Farming is
Harming Our Health, the Environment, and the Economy, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 31, 41 (2012) (citing DAVID KIRBY, ANIMAL FACTORY: THE
LOOMING THREAT OF I NDUSTRIAL PIG, DIARY, AND POULTRY FARMS TO HUMANS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT xiv (St. Martin’s Press 2010)).
45. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10847 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–2, tbl. 5–1).
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of these manure-based emissions.46 The numbers could be
significantly reduced if the livestock were allowed to spread
out over larger geographic areas and in smaller herds, but that
practice is not consistent with standard factory farming
operations.47 Instead, factory farms typically house upwards of
hundreds of animals in a single shed or warehouse-like
structure, and the manure is collected in waste “lagoons.”48
These lagoons produce substantially more emissions than
would be produced by the same number of animals if they were
less confined or permitted to freely roam.49 According to the
EPA, “[w]hen livestock or poultry manure are stored or treated
in systems that promote anaerobic conditions (e.g., as a
liquid/slurry in lagoons, ponds, tanks, or pits), the
decomposition of the volatile solids component in the manure
tends to produce [methane].”50 Alternatively, the EPA
recommends as an emissions-reducing measure that manure
be handled as a solid (e.g., in stacks or drylots) or deposited on
pasture, range, or paddock lands, as it tends to decompose
aerobically and produce little or no methane. 51
II. THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL FARM SUBSIDIES ON
INEXPENSIVE MEAT PRODUCTION
Meat consumption in the U.S. is expected to rise through
2019.52 According to data from the USDA’s National
Agricultural Statistics Service, the average American
consumer ate 217.75 pounds of red meat and poultry in 2018, 53

46. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10847.
47. See Richards & Richards, supra note 44, at 41 (citing KIRBY, supra note 44, at
xiv, 73).
48. See id., supra note 44, at 33, 41.
49. See id., supra note 44, at 41 (citing KIRBY, supra note 44, at 73).
50. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–9; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, supra note 21 (providing a caveat that while handling manure as a solid or
depositing it on pasture rather than storing it in a liquid-based system such as a
lagoon would likely reduce methane emissions, it may actually increase nitrous oxide
emissions).
51. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–9.
52. See Lester Aldrich, USDA Sees Total Meat Consumption Rising Through 2019,
ZIA COMMODITIES (May 25, 2018), http://ziacommodities.com/usda-sees-total-meatconsumption-rising-2019/ [https://perma.cc/PM23-8EUT] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
53. See id.
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slightly less than the previous record of 221.9 pounds in 2004,
but far surpassing average consumption 35 years ago at 181.4
pounds.54 In 2019, “total red meat and poultry consumption
could rise to 217.78 pounds, a 0.03-pound, or 0.01%, gain from
[2018].”55 In 2018, domestic meat production surpassed 100
billion pounds for the first time, “as livestock owners
expand[ed] their herds on the back of cheap feed grain.”56
Given America’s swelling appetite for meat, if the country is
going to make any real progress toward mitigating the
significant climate-change impacts of animal agriculture, it
must first address the underlying financial drivers that are
helping enable the production of inexpensive meat.
In addition to gaping loopholes in federal environmental and
animal-protection laws for industrial animal agriculture
operations,57 some of the primary enablers of factory farming
are federal agricultural support programs for commodity crops,
based on the Farm Bill. The Farm Bill is a multi-year, omnibus
legislation passed roughly every five years that creates and
reauthorizes federal programs dedicated to, among other
things, crop insurance, soil conservation, commodity price
guarantees, and food assistance to low-income earners.58
Today, the federal government doles out about $20 billion
annually in “farm safety net” programs, with about 60% of that
funding devoted to just three commodity crops—corn,
soybeans, and wheat.59 In short, these federal subsidies
effectively keep the prices of commodity crops artificially lower

54. See Megan Durisin & Shruti Singh, Americans Will Eat a Record Amount of
Meat
in
2018,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
2,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-02/have-a-meaty-new-yearamericans-will-eat-record-amount-in-2018 (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
55. Aldrich, supra note 52.
56. See Durisin & Singh, supra note 54.
57. See, e.g., Emily Kenyon, Enough of This Manure: Why the EPA Needs to Define
the Agricultural Stormwater Exemption to Limit the “Runoff” from the ALT Court, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187 (2017) (discussing the lax federal regulatory regime of water
pollution generated on CAFOs); see also Rachel Walker, Blood on the Hands of the
Federal Government: Affirmative Steps That Promote Animal Cruelty, 4 J. ANIMAL L. &
ETHICS 183 (2011) (discussing broad exemptions for farm animals in federal cruelty to
animals statutes).
58. See
generally
The
2014
Farm
Bill,
http://www.thefarmbill.com
[https://perma.cc/UMX3-N7KC] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
59. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10862, 10868.
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than true market value; farmers are thereby encouraged to
overproduce, which floods the market and allows livestock
producers to buy up surplus grains at (or even below) their
production cost to use as animal feed. Low-cost feed reduces
production costs for meat and translates to lower prices,
arguably enticing consumers to buy more affordable meat. 60
To fully understand the current farm subsidies system in
the United States and its influence on low-cost meat
production, it must be viewed in its historical context. Federal
farm support programs began in the late 1920s in response to
the unstable economic conditions in the agricultural sector
caused by the Great Depression and the 1930s Dust Bowl.61
The first iteration of the Farm Bill emerged in the late 1940s
during the post-World War II economic boom. Two decades
later, at the behest of the newly emerged agribusiness lobby,
Congress dramatically expanded the subsidies program to
include direct price deficit payments.62 Below is a synopsis of
some of the key developments in the history of agricultural
subsidies over the past 90 years. The section highlights some
of the major policy shifts that have essentially handed
industrial
farming—and,
thereby,
industrial
animal
agriculture—the economic advantage over smaller, less
intensive, and less polluting farms and producers.
A. The Great Depression and the New Deal
During the 1920s, “[t]he farm crisis was ‘triggered not by too
little food, but by too much.’”63 Overplanting, coupled with
advances in mechanization and soil input, led to vast
60. Notably, though, artificially depreciated feed costs are countered by the increase
in corn and soybean costs associated with conversion to biofuel. See Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr., Biofuel and Advanced Biofuel, 33 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 309, 333–334 (2015)
(noting that “[t]he mandated use of ethanol for fuel and the billions of dollars provided
in government subsidies benefits the corn producers and to a lesser extent soybean
farmers, but livestock and poultry farmers complain that the demand for corn-based
ethanol increases their costs for feed corn”).
61. See Anthony Kammer, Cornography: Perverse Incentives and the United States
Corn Subsidy, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2012).
62. Id. at 13.
63. William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental
Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars, 29 STAN. ENVTL.
L. J. 213, 218 (2009) (quoting DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT: THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
THE NEXT FOOD AND FARM BILL, 33 (Watershed Media 2007)).
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overproduction of most crops, and prices began to dramatically
fall.64 In response, Congress first approved large-scale direct
subsidies to farmers in 1929 with the passage of the
Agricultural Marketing Act.65 In an effort to stave off a
deflationary spiral of food prices, the Act authorized the newly
created Federal Farm Board to spend $500 million to stabilize
prices through direct lending to farmers and government buyouts of surplus crops.66 Ultimately, the bill was unable to stop
crop prices from falling; by 1933, “the price of corn registered
at zero and grain elevators refused to buy any surplus corn.”67
In 1933, as part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal
agenda, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The
Act set mandatory price supports for corn, cotton, and wheat
that offered farmers government-sponsored loans to make up
the difference between production costs and market prices,
“making sure the price of a commodity never deviated too far
from its parity price relative to farmers’ expenses.”68 In
addition, the Act authorized the government “to extend loans
to farmers to grow additional staple commodities, such as corn,
during good years,” which the government would store and
release later when crop yields were low.69 The Supreme Court
struck down parts of the 1933 Act, but Congress passed the
1938 Agriculture Adjustment Act after President Roosevelt’s
infamous 1937 court-packing plan, successfully instituting the
farm subsidy policies first introduced in the 1933 legislation.70
Importantly, the 1938 Act established the basic framework for
all subsequent Farm Bills and is still the prominent policy
backdrop for current commodity programs and farm income
supports.71

64. See id. at 218–19.
65. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 9.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id.
See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 219.
Kammer, supra note 61, at 10.
Id.
See id.
See Kammer, supra note 61, at 11; see also Eubanks, supra note 63, at 221–22.
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B. The Post-War Rise of the Multi-Year Farm Bill and the Big
Ag Lobby
In the initial post-World War II years, federal farm policy
continued to focus on combating rural poverty and mitigating
the inclination for overproduction in impoverished agricultural
communities.72 To achieve those goals, Congress continued to
appropriate funding “through a combination of direct
assistance programs, subsidies for farmers who agreed to take
land out of production, and by making farm credit more readily
available.”73 However, in the decades that followed the War,
many of the original “programs designed to save the family
farm had the unintended consequence of lavishing the greatest
benefits on the largest producers.”74 Smaller farms were
increasingly consolidated into “larger, more industrial
operations.”75 Between 1945 and 1970 the total number of
farms in United States precipitously dropped from nearly 6
million to around 2.5 million.76 Meanwhile, the average farm
size more than doubled.77
The sharp decline of small farms in the post-war decades
can be traced to the concomitant scientific advances in
agriculture during that same period. Specifically, the huge
strides in plant-breeding/hybridization technology during the
Green Revolution78 coupled with the development of new
pesticides and herbicides during the mid-20th century led to
increased crop yields and predictably rapid price declines,
“reminiscent of the farm crisis during the Great Depression.”79
However, during this newer farm crisis the government did not
72. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 11.
73. Id.
74. Eubanks, supra note 63, at 221–22 (quoting DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, INST.
FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y’, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 8
(2003)).
75. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 11.
76. See The Number of Farms Has Leveled Off at About 2.05 Million, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. (2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery/chartdetail/?chartId=58268 [https://perma.cc/KLM3-FWN5] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
77. See id.
78. For a brief synopsis of the Green Revolution, see Green Revolution, THE ENVTL.
LITERACY
COUNCIL,
https://enviroliteracy.org/food/food-production-supply/greenrevolution/ [https://perma.cc/695X-K7Y9] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
79. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 222.
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step in to protect the small farmers. Instead, the newly
established large, industrial farms were able to weather the
depressed market while further consolidating their land
holdings by purchasing foreclosed smaller farms at bargain
prices.80
In addition to expanding their financial power in the postwar decades, these large farms also joined forces with one
another to create the first agribusiness lobby, and they
leveraged their new political power to influence the policy
priorities of the various Farm Bills during this period.81
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 was the first omnibus
multi-year farm legislation and continues to serve as Congress’
basic template for food policy.82 As one legal scholar notes, the
concept of the multi-year Farm Bill was “to provide policymakers with opportunities to make regular, comprehensive
changes to food and agriculture policy, but instead [it] provided
more frequent intervals for lobbyists to influence the
legislation.”83 For example, the 1965 Act established
mandatory acreage allotments, planting restrictions, and
marketing quotas,84 all of which disproportionately favored
large farms.
C. The 1970s Food Crisis and the Ensuing Subsidies “Spigot”
Global crop production severely declined in the early 1970s,
leading to an international food crisis that set the stage for
arguably the most significant shift in farm policy since the
Great Depression.85 Capitalizing on the alarming food
insecurities worldwide, Congress passed the 1973 Agriculture
and Consumer Protection Act.86 One of the most notable parts
of this transformative bill was the creation of a system of
target prices and deficiency payments, whereby commodity
producers received direct payments from the federal
government “anytime the market price fell below the
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 13.
83. Id., supra note 61, at 11.
84. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 13.
85. See id., supra note 61, at 14.
86. See id.
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Congressionally specified target price.”87
This new system of price guarantees was one piece of a
larger policy agenda of the Nixon administration to massively
expand American commodity production—even to the point of
overproduction. President Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture at
the time, Earl Butz, vociferously advocated for farmers to “get
big or get out” and to “plant from fencerow to fencerow”,88
“arguing that overproduction and a resultant drop in the price
of commodity grains would increase exports” abroad.89 While
subsidies had been included in every Farm Bill since its first
iteration in 1933, the dramatic change under the 1973 Act
from loans to deficiency payments was “‘revolutionary’”
because “‘the new subsidies encouraged farmers to sell their
[commodity crops] at any price, since the government [and
thus taxpayers] would make up the difference.’”90
Agribusiness specifically lobbied for the shift to deficiency
payments with the express goal of “ensur[ing] a steady supply
of cheap commodity crops that they could trade internationally
and process into value-added products”91 like ethanol or highfructose corn syrup.92 With this major agribusiness-friendly
shift firmly enshrined in federal legislation by 1973, some of
the largest “grain processors, namely Cargill and Archer
Daniels Midland (ADM), exerted considerable influence over
the Farm Bill drafting process and actually wrote large
industry-favorable portions of the Farm Bills in the 1980s.”93
Indeed, deficiency payments for covered commodity crops—i.e.,
corn, soy, and wheat—remained a central component of every
subsequent Farm Bill through its 2008 iteration.
The 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills built upon the Nixon
administration’s original model and offered additional support
to commodity farmers in the form of direct payments. 94 On top
87. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 15.
88. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 224 (citing IMHOFF, supra note 63, at 38).
89. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 15.
90. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 226 (quoting MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S
DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS 52 (The Penguin Press 2006)).
91. Eubanks, supra note 63, at 226 (quoting IMHOFF, supra note 63, at 39).
92. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 15, 24.
93. Eubanks, supra note 63, at 226 (citing IMHOFF, supra note 63, at 39 (“Cargill and
Archer Daniels Midland were essentially writing the Farm Bills.”)).
94. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 20.
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of the deficiency payments that had been carried over into
every Farm Bill since 1973, these direct payments handed
commodity producers an additional fixed amount on a perbushel basis, regardless of annual fluctuations in price or
yield.95 That is, the government guaranteed to pay farmers a
certain, fixed amount “regardless of how much they actually
planted or how much they would sell their crops for.”96 For
example, even if market prices rose above the Congressionally
established floor, under the 2002 Farm Bill, “farmers were
guaranteed $2.60 from 2002-03 and $2.63 from 2004-2007 per
bushel of corn under the deficiency payment system, on top of
which they would receive an additional direct payment[] of 28
cents per bushel.”97 So if a bushel of corn in 2007 sold for $2.50,
the farmer would receive an additional $0.41 per bushel from
the government—a deficiency payment of 13 cents, plus a
direct payment of 28 cents per bushel.
All told, through the early 2000s, when the deficiency and
direct payments were added to the other commodity subsidies
like the marketing loan program and crop insurance program
(see infra Part II.d.1), the federal agricultural support system
cost taxpayers billions of dollars. 98 Shockingly, in a single
decade between 1997 and 2006, American taxpayers spent
$172 billion on commodity subsidies. 99 And even more
surprising, agribusiness continued to receive billions in tax
dollars despite earning record profits at their megafarms: “[i]n
2005 alone, when pretax farm profits were at a near-record $72
billion, the federal government handed out more than $25
billion in aid [to big farms], almost 50 percent more than the
amount it [paid] to families receiving welfare [in the United
States that year].”100
95. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 21–22.
96. Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, In One Graph, WASH. POST, Jan. 28,
2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/28/the-950-billionfarm-bill-in-one-chart/?utm_term=.413d5cf78ef1 [https://perma.cc/2ERF-HDX7] (last
visited Mar. 12, 2019).
97. Kammer, supra note 61, at 22.
98. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 227.
99. Dan Morgan et al., Farm Program Pays $1.3 Billion to People Who Don’t Farm,
WASH.
POST,
July
2,
2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/07/01/AR2006070100962.html [https://perma.cc/TG5Q-L2ZJ]
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
100. Id.

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019

17

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 3

2019]

CORN, COWS, AND CLIMATE CHANGE

43

D. Current Farm Bill Programs: The “Farm Safety Net”
The most recent iteration of the Farm Bill—the Agriculture
Act of 2014 (more commonly referred to as the 2014 Farm
Bill)—made some modest cutbacks in agricultural subsidies
but still appropriated over $134 billion for crop insurance and
commodity programs over the next 10 years.101 Notably, meat
producers do not receive any direct financial support under the
2014 Farm Bill (and did not under the pre-2014 program), but
they remain eligible for emergency and disaster relief, 102 which
totaled $9.8 billion from 1995 to 2016. 103 Ninety billion dollars
was allotted for crop insurance—$7 billion more than the
previous law’s allocation; meanwhile, $44.4 billion was
earmarked for commodity programs—$14 billion less than
before.104 Even more federal money was appropriated in the
2014 Farm Bill for subsidized loans to commodity farmers.105
Collectively, these federal support programs are referred to as
the “farm safety net”.106 Each of these three categories—crop
insurance, commodity programs, and the marketing loan
program—is examined in turn below.
1. Crop Insurance
The bulk of the subsidies for “farm safety net” programs go
to crop insurance. For decades, farmers have been able to buy
federally subsidized crop insurance in case their crops fail or
prices abruptly decline. The 2014 Farm Bill expanded the crop
insurance subsidies by adding $7 billion to prior allocation in
101. See Plumer, supra note 96.
102. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 11119 (citing DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RES.
SERV., FARM COMMODITY PROVISIONS IN THE 2014 FARM BILL (P.L. 113–79) (2014).
103. See
EWG’s
Farm
Subsidy
Database,
ENVTL.
WORKING
GRP.,
https://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=total_lea&regionname=the
UnitedStates [https://perma.cc/P5SJ-6SE2] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
104. See Plumer, supra note 96.
105. Id.
106. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10862. The “farm safety net” also
includes conservation payments, which are outside the scope of this paper. The 2014
Farm Bill budgeted $57.6 billion over ten years for conservation—$4 billion less than
the previous law. See Plumer, supra note 96. In short, conservation programs are
designed to pay farmers to grow on less land and “to help [them] protect against soil
erosion and to use ecologically friendly methods like drip irrigation.” Plumer, supra
note 96.
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order to cover “the deductibles that farmers have to pay before
the insurance kicks in.”107 Additionally, the federal
government agreed to pay 65% of the farmers’ insurance
premiums.108
The two primary categories of crop insurance are yield
protection and revenue protection.109 As their names suggest,
“[y]ield protection covers farmers when their yield falls below a
certain percentage of the expected yield,” as calculated from
historical yields, while “[r]evenue protection covers farmers if
their revenue falls below a certain percentage of expected
revenue”.110 The lion’s share of federal spending on crop
insurance premium subsidies supports revenue protection
plans.111 “For example, $5.5 billion of the $6.7 billion spent on
subsidies in 2012 was for revenue protection premium
subsidies.”112 Notably, only a handful of select crops qualify for
revenue protection insurance.113
While “[p]roponents of the current crop insurance system
often portray it as a safety net for farmers in the case of
natural disaster”, it goes well beyond that. 114 “[I]n addition to
protecting farmers from crop losses—routine or not—its use of
revenue guarantees also ensures that covered crops” like corn,
wheat, and soybeans remain profitable despite a drop in
prices.115 Moreover, relying on a study by the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI),116 the Environmental Working
107. See Plumer, supra note 96.
108. Tamar Haspel, Farm Bill: Why Don’t Taxpayers Subsidize the Foods That are
Better
for
Us?,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
18,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/farm-bill-why-dont-taxpayers-subsidizethe-foods-that-are-better-for-us/2014/02/14/d7642a3c-9434-11e3-84e127626c5ef5fb_story.html?utm_term=.143a64eb6037
[https://perma.cc/UCW7-K9HB]
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
109. Ann Jaworski, Encouraging Climate Adaptation Through Reform of Federal
Crop Insurance Subsidies, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1684, 1691 (2016).
110. Id. at 1691–92.
111. See id. at 1692.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10862.
115. Id.
116. See Anton Bekkerman et al., Where the Money Goes: The Distribution of Crop
Insurance and Other Farm Subsidy Payments, AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.aei.org/publication/where-the-money-goes-the-distribution-of-cropinsurance-and-other-farm-subsidy-payments/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
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Group (EWG) argues that a disproportionate amount of these
crop insurance subsidies go to the wealthiest farm operators.117
AEI reports that “[t]he top 10 percent of farms,” measured by
crop sales, “received almost 70 percent of all crop insurance
subsidies,” and “[t]he top 2 percent received 30 percent of all
premium subsidies—about $50 an acre, or four times more
than the average crop insurance subsidy recipient receives.”118
And “[u]nlike traditional commodity subsidies, there are no
payment limits, means testing or transparency requirements
for recipients of crop insurance subsidies.”119 As EWG argues,
“[t]his means that growers and farm businesses can receive
unlimited taxpayer subsidies via the crop insurance program
even if they are billionaires.”120
2. Commodity Programs
“This section [of the 2014 Farm Bill] includes a variety of
programs to shield [commodity] farmers against sharp
fluctuations in [corn, wheat, and soybean] prices.”121 The most
prominent policy change for commodity programs in 2014 was
the elimination of fixed direct payments (as described
above).122 In place of direct payments, the Farm Bill boosted
the variable payments to farmers and landowners “when crop
prices or revenue declines.”123 Farmers must “choose between
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage
(ARC) and receive payments when price (for PLC) or revenue
(for ARC) drops below” the Congressionally set threshold.124
Together, PLC and ARC distribute “more than $4 billion each

117. Scott Faber, Have Farmers Been Forgotten by Washington?, ENVTL. WORKING
GRP. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.ewg.org/agmag/2018/01/have-farmers-been-forgottenwashington#.WpICGyPMwWo [https://perma.cc/XCM8-2VST] (last visited Mar. 12,
2019).
118. Id.
119. Colin O’Neil, Are Billionaires Getting Crop Insurance Subsidies? We Still Don’t
Know, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.ewg.org/agmag/2016/04/arebillionaires-getting-crop-insurance-subsidies-we-still-don-t-know#.WpIEkCPMwWo
[https://perma.cc/EEY5-TS4P] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
120. Id.
121. Plumer, supra note 96.
122. See SHIELDS, supra note 102, at 1.
123. Id.
124. Haspel, supra note 108.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol9/iss1/3

20

Smith: Corn, Cows, and Climate Change: How Federal Agricultural Subsidie

46

WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:1

year” to farmers.125
3. Marketing Loan Program
The 2014 Farm Bill also continued a marketing assistance
loan program.126 This program has been “[a] key part of federal
farm subsidies since the New Deal” era.127 It was initially
designed to give farmers “short-term financing to pay farm
expenses before crops were sold”, but even the CATO Institute,
a self-branded libertarian think tank, 128 once concluded that
“[the marketing assistance loan program] has morphed into
simply another multi-billion-dollar subsidy program.”129
“Under the original system, the government extended loans to
farmers to allow them to pay operational expenses before
harvest, and after the crops were sold, farmers would then
repay the government.”130 However, because the only penalty
farmers faced for not repaying the loans was that they had to
forfeit their crops to the government, over time farmers
stopped repaying during years when crop prices were low.131
Furthermore, “[o]n top of this de facto subsidy, taxpayers also
bear the expense of maintaining the government’s commodity
stockpiles.”132 Between 1995 and 2010, these programs cost
taxpayers an estimated $77.1 billion in additional subsidies to
commodity farmers, averaging about $4.8 billion in annual
transfers to corn producers alone.133

125. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10863.
126. Donahue, supra note 9, at 11119.
127. Kammer, supra note 61, at 23.
128. CATO’s
Mission,
CATO
INST.,
https://www.cato.org/mission
[https://perma.cc/R4W6-ZMCX] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
129. CHRIS EDWARDS & TAD DEHAVEN, FARM SUBSIDIES AT RECORD LEVELS AS
CONGRESS CONSIDERS NEW FARM BILL, CATO INST. 6 (Oct. 18, 2001),
https://object.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp70.pdf.
130. Kammer, supra note 61, at 23–24.
131. See id., supra note 61, at 24.
132. Id.
133. See id. (citing EWG’s Farm Subsidy Database, ENVTL. WORKING GRP.,
http://farm.ewg.org/ [https://perma.cc/PVP3-B32K]) (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
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III. MAKING THE CONNECTION: COMMODITY
SUBSIDIES AND CHEAP MEAT
Industrial animal agriculture facilities have been some of
the biggest indirect beneficiaries of our nation’s commodity
crop subsidies. In his book Meatonomics, economist David
Simon aptly summarizes the direct nexus between federal
commodity subsidies and cheap-meat production:
It may come as little surprise, but the handful of
farmers who consistently harvest the most greenbacks
from crop subsidies, research shows, are livestock
producers. The reason: corn and soybeans are the main
items on the menus for livestock, accounting for the
majority of feed ingredients in factory farms (where
virtually all [U.S.] farm animals are raised). This
makes factory farms the biggest consumers of these
subsidized commodities, and they buy most of the corn
and soybeans grown in the United States. 134
The sheer volume of meat generated by factory farms in this
country is staggering. An estimated 82% of cattle currently
sold in the United States are raised on feedlots135 (i.e, on
“factory farms”)136, and the total number of farm animals being
housed at these industrial facilities has been steadily
increasing over the past few decades. Between 2002 and 2012,
the number of livestock animals on the largest factory farms

134. DAVID ROBINSON SIMON, MEATONOMICS: HOW THE RIGGED ECONOMICS OF MEAT
DAIRY MAKE YOU CONSUME TOO MUCH—AND HOW TO EAT BETTER, LIVE LONGER,
AND SPEND SMARTER 81 (Conari Press 2013).
135. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., CATTLE: JANUARY 1 CATTLE I NVENTORY UP 1
PERCENT,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
AGRIC.
’1
(Jan
31,
2018),
https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usdaesmis/files/h702q636h/c534fr214/z316q364w/Catt-01-31-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QT8T-RW6L].
136. A “factory farm” is another term for a large concentrated animal feeding
operation (CAFO). According to the USDA’s definition, “[a] CAFO is an [animal
feeding operation] with more than 1000 animal units (an animal unit is defined as an
animal equivalent of 1000 pounds live weight and equates to 1000 head of beef cattle,
700 dairy cows, 2500 swine weighing more than 55 lbs., 125 thousand broiler chickens,
or 82 thousand laying hens or pullets) confined on site for more than 45 days during
the year.” Animal Feeding Operations, NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T. OF
AGRIC.,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/plantsanimals/livestock/afo/
[https://perma.cc/Y9BS-XYGZ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
AND
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rose by 20%, while “[t]he total number of livestock units137 on
factory farms increased from 23.7 million in 2002 to 28.5
million in 2012.”138 More specifically, the average size of a
cattle feedlot (with a capacity of 1,000 or more head of cattle)
increased by 13.7% over a five-year span, from 3,800 in 2007 to
more than 4,300 in 2012. 139 A recent USDA inventory
estimates that as of January 1, 2018, there were 14 million
cattle and calves being fattened on feedlots, up 7% from 13.1
million in 2017, while across the country there were 94.4
million cattle and calves both on and off feedlots as of January
1, 2018, up 1% from 93.7 million from 2017. 140
What accounts for this continuous growth? Factory farms
are able to continue to expand their (already massive)
production capacities in large part because they save billions of
dollars each year in operational expenses by purchasing
heavily subsidized corn and soybeans at prices below what it
actually costs to grow them. 141 Between 1996 and 2005,
industrial livestock facilities saved an estimated $3.9 billion
annually by buying discounted feed.142 A 2006 report by the
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy estimated that
poultry and pig producers’ overall costs would be 7 to 10%
higher if they paid feed farmers the true market price of their
crops.143
137. “A ‘livestock unit’ is a way to measure different kinds of animals on the same
scale based on their weight—one beef cattle is the equivalent of approximately twothirds of a dairy cow, eight hogs, or four hundred chickens.” See Factory Farms
Continue to Dominate U.S. Livestock Industry, FOOD & WATER WATCH (May 27, 2015),
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/factory-farms-continue-dominate-uslivestock-industry [https://perma.cc/X9BJ-B7QR] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., supra note 135, at 1.
141. See DOUG G URIAN-SHERMAN, CAFOS UNCOVERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF
CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 3 (Apr.
2008),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/food_and_agricultur
e/cafos-uncovered-executive-summary.pdf (estimating that between 1996 and 2005,
CAFOs saved an average of $3.86 billion each year in feed costs because of federal
grain subsidies).
142. See id. at tbl. ES–1 at 6.
143. R. Dennis Olson, BELOW-COST FEED CROPS: AN INDIRECT SUBSIDY FOR
INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FACTORIES, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y (June 2006),
https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/258_2_88122_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DKA6Y6GG] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
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While these artificially low feed prices certainly increase
profit margins for livestock producers, the benefits are also
passed on to consumers by increasing both the availability and
affordability of meat.144 For example, McDonald’s sells about
550 million Big Macs annually in the United States.145
Meatonomics author David Simon assessed the true price of a
Big Mac if it included costs taxpayers already contribute
through federal agricultural subsidies. 146 He concluded that
each burger should cost an additional $0.70—a 15% hike over
its average retail price in the United States of $4.56 in 2013. 147
IV. SHIFTING SUBSIDIES TO SPECIALTY CROPS
As examined above, one of the most glaring problems with
the Farm Bill is that “[t]axpayers heavily subsidize corn and
soy, two crops that facilitate the meat and processed food we’re
supposed to eat less of, and do almost nothing for the fruits
and vegetables we’re supposed to eat more of.”148 Certainly,
there is no guarantee that if the federal government stopped
subsiding commodity crops American consumers would buy
fewer Big Macs (or meat products in general) just because of a
modest 70-cent price increase per burger. But perhaps
consumers would be inclined to opt for less carbon-polluting—
and more nutritious—fruits, vegetables, and grains if these
foods were also subsidized and could better compete with
propped up meat products.
Because most cropland in the United States is not used to
grow fruits, vegetables, and grains for human consumption, a
shift in consumer choices regarding meat products could

144. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 27.
145. Sean Alfano, Big Mac Hits the Big 4-0, CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2007),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/big-mac-hits-the-big-4-0/ [https://perma.cc/45CA-TVC5]
(last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
146. Each Time McDonald’s Sells a Big Mac, We’re Out $7, MEATONOMICS (2013),
https://meatonomics.com/2013/08/15/each-time-mcdonalds-sells-a-big-mac-were-out-7/
[https://perma.cc/FE3B-LZH2] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (citing SIMON, supra note
134).
147. Simon argues that a Big Mac’s true cost is $12.00 (250% above its average
market price of $4.56), which includes an additional $0.38 for animal cruelty, $0.67 for
environmental losses, $0.70 for agricultural subsidies, and $5.69 for healthcare costs.
SIMON, supra note 134..
148. Haspel, supra note 108.
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influence farmers’ crop choices.149 “Only about 2 percent of U.S.
farmland is used to grow [specialty crops], while 59 percent is
devoted to commodity crops.”150 For example, in 2013, of the
336 million acres of cropland planted in the U.S., roughly 95
million acres were used to grow corn.151 And of the corn used
domestically in 2017, less than 12% was actually used for food,
seed, and industrial uses, while 44% was used for animal
feed.152
In theory, consumer pressure may be able to discourage
farmers from planting heavily subsidized commodity feed crops
and, instead, encourage them to grow a broader spectrum of
specialty crops that could be harvested for direct human
consumption. A 2013 report from the Union of Concerned
Scientists “use[d] an economic model developed by Purdue
University’s Global Trade Analysis Project to predict how U.S.
farmers would respond to various shifts in eating habits.”153
The report found “that if Americans ate fruits and vegetables
at USDA-recommended levels—increasing consumption by 173
percent over current levels—U.S. farmers would grow 88
percent more of these foods.”154 “Conversely, if meat and dairy
consumption fell to levels recommended by the Harvard
University School of Public Health, farmers would grow less
corn and other grains used as livestock feed—8 million acres
less.”155

149. Most domestic cropland is used to grow animal feed. See Jaworski, supra note
109, at 1703.
150. Less Corn, More Fruits and Vegetables Would Benefit U.S. Farmers, Consumers
and Rural Communities, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 22, 2013),
https://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/less-corn-more-fruits-and-vegetables0378.html#.WsKjNWbMwWo [https://perma.cc/AL7F-PKT3] (last visited Mar. 13,
2019).
151. Jaworski, supra note 109, at 1703–04.
152. Corn
Usage by Segment 2017,
NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N,
http://www.worldofcorn.com/#corn-usage-by-segment
[https://perma.cc/9W58-GH2B]
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
153. Less Corn, supra note 150.
154. Id.
155. Id. (noting that if beef and dairy consumption fell to recommended levels,
farmers would grow about 8 million acres less of corn and other feed grains). In 2017,
beef cows made up 77% of the 41.1 million total cows in the United States: 31.7 million
beef cows and 9.4 million dairy cows. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., supra note 135, at 1.
By extension then, beef cows consumed roughly three-quarters of all the grains fed to
cattle, or about 6 of the 8 million total acres-worth feed crops fed to American cattle.
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Notably, though, “[i]f Americans increased their
consumption of fruits and vegetables to levels recommended by
federal dietary guidelines, production of these crops would
require an additional 13 million acres of [crop]land.”156 While
at first glance this may seem an impossible task, on closer
inspection, a modest shift away from commodity crop
production could result in relatively huge increases in land
available for fruit and vegetable cultivation. By one estimate,
“a 1 percent decrease in the 160 million acres of corn and soy
[would] translate[] to an 11 percent increase in the 14 million
acres of [agricultural land dedicated to the production of] fruits
and vegetables.”157
Shifting production away from feed crops and toward a more
diverse array of fruits, vegetables, and grains intended for
human consumption would also help make our food production
system more efficient at making more calories and protein
available to a wider mass of people. “[F]eed crop cultivation
produces more calories per acre than human crop foods, with
the result that [livestock] eat [nearly] two-thirds of [all]
calories derived from crops grown in the United States.”158
“However, only a fraction of those crop calories are delivered to
humans because, for example, the production of one pound of
beef from feedlot cattle requires 15-20 pounds of grain.”159 Put
another way,
More than one-half of all plant protein in the United
States is used to feed animals. Only 14% of U.S.produced protein is used as human food; 80% is used as
animal feed. If U.S. consumption of grain-fed animal
products were cut by 50%, calorie availability would
increase by enough to feed an additional 2 billion
people.160
156. Agriculture and Health Policies in Conflict: How Food Subsidies Tax Our
Health,
PHYSICIANS
COMM.
FOR
RESPONSIBLE
MED.,
http://www.pcrm.org/health/reports/agriculture-and-health-policies-unhealthful-foods
(last visited Sep. 15, 2018) (citing Press Release, Am. Farmland Tr., The United States
Needs 13 Million More Acres of Fruits and Vegetables to Meet the RDA (July 7,
2010), http://www.farmland.org/news/pressreleases/13-Million-More-Acres.asp).
157. Haspel, supra note 108 (“Whether that would translate to increased
consumption is, of course, another question.”).
158. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10847.
159. Id.
160. Donahue, supra note 9, at 11116 (internal citations omitted).
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One way to promote the production of a diversity of fruits,
vegetables, and grains in this country would be for the federal
government to provide crop insurance subsidies to specialty
crop growers the way it does for commodity crop producers.161
The federal crop insurance program applies to over 100
crops.162 Although “[t]his marks a huge expansion from 1980
when only twenty-six crops were eligible,”163 economists argue
that the insurance program is still woefully inadequate to
catalyze a marked shift toward specialty crop production.164
According to Vincent Smith, professor of economics at Montana
State University and a former visiting scholar at AEI, weather
events pose the greatest risk to specialty crop growers.165
While many private weather insurance plans currently
available do cover a wide variety of crops, many farmers do not
buy these insurance packages because they are not
subsidized.166 Albeit cautiously optimistic, Smith predicts if the
federal crop insurance program were expanded to include
subsidies for specialty crops, “there would be some price
effect”—but how much would be “[a]nybody’s guess.”167
Perhaps unexpectedly, mushrooms appear to be one
specialty crop that shows promise for helping to reduce the
greenhouse gas emissions associated with meat production and
could also potentially benefit from an expanded crop insurance
subsidy program. Fast food chains are experimenting with
adding mushrooms to their hamburger to boost flavor and
reduce the amount of meat in each patty. Recently, Sonic
Drive-In, a fast food chain that has not been widely associated
with eco-conscious food products, announced that it was adding
blended beef-mushroom burgers to its menu. 168 The company
161. See supra Part II.d.1 for an overview of the crop insurance program.
162. See RISK MGMT. AGENCY, 2015 COUNTY CROP PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.rma.usda.gov/data/cropprograms/2015cropprograms.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2018) (most recent listing of the various crops eligible for insurance). Although
it is called “crop” insurance, the program also covers other aspects of agriculture
unrelated to growing plants, such as livestock, apiculture (beekeeping), and clams. Id.
163. Jaworski, supra note 109, at 1690–91.
164. See Haspel, supra note 108.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Dan Charles, Here’s Why Environmentalists are Cheering the Latest Burger
at
Sonic
Drive-In,
NAT’L.
PUB.
RADIO
(Mar.
2,
2018),
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downplays any potential positive environmental impact,
emphasizing instead the added flavor and juiciness
mushrooms provide.169 Even so, “[a]ccording to the World
Resources Institute, if 30 percent of the beef in every burger in
America were replaced by mushrooms, it would reduce
greenhouse emissions by the same amount as taking 2.3
million vehicles off of our roads.”170
If Sonic’s beef-mushroom burger sales are strong—because
of their taste, their eco-friendly appeal, or both—other fast
food chains will likely start to produce similar products. In
that case, mushrooms will be in higher demand. Specialty
farmers would then be incentivized to start producing more
mushrooms so long as they can adequately minimize their
risk—crop insurance programs are one of the most effective
ways to do that. As described supra in Part II.d.1, “there are
two primary categories of crop insurance: yield protection and
revenue protection.” In both programs, the federal government
pays a significant portion of the insurance premiums to
farmers who produce certain crops. Yield protection is
designed to protect farmers during low-yield years due to
weather events like flooding or drought,171 and revenue
protection ensures farmers are compensated if crop prices drop
below a predetermined threshold. 172
Because mushrooms are cultivated indoors in controlled
settings,173 mushroom farmers do not necessarily face the same
concerns about weather events that other specialty crop

https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/03/02/590253046/heres-whyenvironmentalists-are-cheering-the-latest-burger-at-sonic-drive-in
[https://perma.cc/6RAA-9YCU] (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See ECON. RES. SERV., CROP I NSURANCE PROGRAM PROVISIONS–TITLE XI, U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commoditypolicy/crop-insurance-program-provisions-title-xi/ [https://perma.cc/JN9X-68HK] (last
visited Mar. 12, 2019).
172. Jaworski, supra note 109, at 1691–92.
173. See Roger Morris, The One Tiny Region That Produces Nearly Half of U.S.
Mushrooms,
MODERN
FARMER
(May
16,
2014),
https://modernfarmer.com/2014/05/welcome-mushroom-country-population-nearlyhalf-u-s-mushrooms/ [https://perma.cc/43B6-M5EM] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019)
(noting that in the U.S. mushrooms are grown primarily in single-level cinderblock
buildings—variously called mushroom “barns,” “houses” and “doubles”).
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farmers might. Therefore, they likely would not benefit from
being included in the yield protection program. However,
mushroom farmers could potentially benefit greatly if they
were able to receive subsidies to cover the premium costs for
revenue protection insurance. The federal government already
spends billions of dollars every year subsidizing premiums for
revenue insurance programs.174 In fact, the vast majority of
federal spending on crop insurance premium subsidies—$5.5
billion of the total $6.7 billion in 2012—subsidizes revenue
protection plans.175 The problem is that none of this money
goes to support specialty crops. Indeed, only ten commodity
crops are eligible for revenue protection premium subsidies,
with corn and soybeans predictably gobbling up nearly twothirds of the federal funding.176
Mushrooms already have a well-established market in the
United States. In 2017, the domestic mushroom crop capped
out at $1.22 billion, up 3% from the previous season.177
Between 2014 and 2017, the average price of mushrooms
nationwide remained relatively stable at around $1.30 per
pound.178 But in some parts of the country, the prices fell as
much $0.18 per pound in a single year, which translated to
total lost revenue of $35 million in those areas. 179 This price
flux, while seemingly modest, might be alarming enough to
many mushroom farmers to discourage them from expanding
their production capacities without revenue protection
insurance because of the inherent financial risk involved.
Consider the following hypothetical: If Sonic’s new blended

174. See Jarworski, supra note 109, at 1692.
175. Id.
176. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CROP INSURANCE: CONSIDERATIONS IN
REDUCING
FEDERAL
PREMIUM
SUBSIDIES
14
(Aug.
2014),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665267.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNL5-WR9W]. The ten
covered crops, in descending order of total revenue premium subsidies provided, are:
corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, grain sorghum, sunflowers, canola, rice, barley, and
popcorn.
177. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., AGRIC. STAT. BD. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
MUSHROOMS 1 (Aug. 21, 2017), https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usdaesmis/files/r781wg03d/1r66j3656/wm117r667/Mush-08-21-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WB3M-4J2Y].
178. Id.
179. See id. at 4 (showing that the price per pound of mushrooms in “other states”
dropped from $1.65 to $1.47 between the 2014–2015 and 2015–2016 seasons).
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mushroom-beef burgers is any indication of rising demand,
should production rates remain static, it would drive up the
cost of mushrooms because demand would outpace current
supply. In turn, fast food chains—and consumers generally—
may not be as inclined to incorporate mushrooms as meat
substitutes, thereby negating their potential to help mitigate
U.S. livestock-related greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, if
the federal government extended revenue protection premium
subsidies to include mushrooms, farmers would be incentivized
to expand production, which could, in turn, help kick start a
national trend toward reduced meat consumption.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, if the United States is going to contribute to the
collective international effort to tackle climate change, the
federal government must develop a comprehensive strategy
that prioritizes mitigating the impacts of the nation’s
industrial animal agriculture sector. An effective emissionsreduction strategy must be multi-faceted and address not just
livestock-related emissions themselves, but also the underlying
drivers of factory farming. This necessarily includes
significantly revising our federal crop subsidies, which are
providing livestock producers with a seemingly endless supply
of cheap feed grains and enabling them to produce meat and
dairy products well below their true cost of production.
Overhauling the agricultural subsidies programs could level
the playing field between commodity crop and specialty crop
production and, in turn, potentially catalyze a much-needed
shift in consumer choices away from meat and toward more
plant-based alternatives.
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